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Automatic Modernism: 
D. H. Lawrence, Vitalism, and the Political Body 
 
Across the disciplinary spectrum, renewed attention to the body’s role in shaping 
thought is dramatically recasting our understanding of the origins of subjectivity, the 
conditions of personal agency, and the logic of political modernity.  Recent critical 
interest in the politics of the material world has hastened a return to such twentieth 
century thinkers as Henri Bergson and Hans Driesch, as well as the scientific contexts of 
early psychology, sociology and pragmatism.  In the fervor of the moment, however, we 
sometimes forget that recent critical theory is hardly the first intellectual attempt to 
wrestle with the implications of cognitive science and new theories of embodiment.  
Modernism followed a century during which Cartesian speculations about the 
mechanistic basis of human behavior found experimental validation in the work of 
Lamarck, Loeb, von Helmholtz and others, who argued that the milieu of a given 
organism played a primary role in shaping and delimiting its range of possible 
development—a fact that applied as well to humans as to caterpillars.  By the late 
nineteenth century, as physiologists like Ivan Pavlov worked to establish the rules by 
which the physical environment conditions reflexes and creates the neural patterns of 
behavior we call habits, questions central to scientific materialism had begun to enter the 
mainstream of cultural and political life.  From pragmatism to public relations, the 
physiological discourse of an automatic, conditioned body became fundamental to the 
most diverse accounts of political modernity.   
For many political theorists, the physiologically habitual body indeed became an 
important site of modernity itself—a guarantor of social cohesion of amid the tumult of 
social dislocation.  As British philosopher and political theorist Bernard Bosanquet 
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explained in 1899, “social life is necessarily and increasingly constituted by adjustments 
which have become automatic, and are in a large measure withdrawn from public 
attention” (1899: 167).  A habitual body that “receives the imprimatur of the State” could 
thus be seen as the very “condition of social progress” (1899: 167) – or, as William 
James memorably phrased it in 1890, “the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most 
precious conservative agent” (1981: 125).  For contemporaries of James and Bosanquet, 
the findings of physiological science harbored the utopian promises of modernity, in 
which the body’s power to conform to the passive work of stimuli augured a politically 
automatic social body.  While the scientific aspects of these debates were, with some 
exceptions,1 remote from novelists and poets themselves, the question of material 
embodiment raised a host of political and aesthetic problems that saturate the cultural life 
of the twentieth century.   
In the essay that follows, I recover the influence of these materialist concerns on 
modernism by focusing on the relationship between automatic behavior and literary form.  
Returning to debates about embodiment now animating the new materialisms, I argue 
that habitual and automatic behaviors functioned as categories of experience central to 
the political life of modernism.  My analysis will center on D. H. Lawrence, whose work 
was guided by an informed preoccupation with materialist science and its political 
implications.  Like many of his contemporaries, Lawrence’s work persistently takes aim 
at the collusion of positivism and the institutions of modern life.  By treating the human 
as “a sort of complex mechanism made up of numerous little machines working 
automatically in a rather unsatisfactory relation to one another” (Lawrence, 2004a: 95), 
                                                 
1 Gertrude Stein is a famous exception.  Working as a research assistant for William James in the 1890s, 
Stein co-authored two papers on motor automatism. 
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capitalist modernity, he argued, enforced socially orthodox habits of thought and action 
that undermined the genuine individuality of subjects.  But, rather than insisting on the 
free, radical agency of individual minds, Lawrence endeavored to imagine new forms of 
collective life defined above all by a materially indeterminate body. 
Lawrence’s work has often been described as exhibiting a marked distrust of 
collectivist politics.2  In accounting for his longstanding interest in the politics of 
embodiment, I hope to challenge the critical perspective that sees in Lawrence an 
apolitical individualism.  Looking at his non-fiction works of the 1920s, as well as both 
late and early novels, I argue that Lawrence’s thinking about materiality, especially his 
understanding of positivist science, informed the political dimensions of his novels in ways 
that mirror the work of vitalist philosophers Henri Bergson and George Sorel.  My analysis 
centers on Lawrence’s much neglected, late novel The Plumed Serpent (1926).  Bringing 
the concerns of this novel into dialogue with Bergson and Sorel, I read The Plumed 
Serpent as a work that imagines a vitalist mode of social organization.  Employing the 
distinctive formal qualities of vitalist discourse, The Plumed Serpent promotes the vitalist 
polity that it depicts through an appeal to readerly embodiment. This vitalist approach to 
literary form, I suggest, constitutes part of a larger modernist reaction to the political 
appropriation of materialist science in the twentieth century. 
 
Lawrence and the Politics of Vitalism 
 
At once critical of scientific materialism and deeply invested in the material body, 
Lawrence’s work persistently exposes the political stakes of embodiment in the twentieth 
                                                 
2 Lawrence critic David Parker, for example, has recently argued that Women in Love is a novel that refuses 
politics in favor of the permanent ontological possibility of individuals.  As Parker argues, Lawrence rejects 
“any larger political responsibility or social consciousness is a form of false consciousness—a strategy for 
avoiding the responsibility of looking closely into oneself” (2006: 94). 
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century.  The language of physiology appears throughout both his fiction and non-fiction 
as a marker of distinctly modern forms of political and cultural “automatism.”  Such 
language was a natural extension of his own readings as a young man; familiar with a 
variety of post-Darwinian analyses of material embodiment, including the work of 
Herbert Spencer, T. H. Huxley, and William James, Lawrence was acutely aware of 
ongoing debates about the new scientific discourses of embodiment and the consequences 
of such thinking for modern culture at large.  As Jeff Wallace has suggested, exposure to 
these thinkers put Lawrence fundamentally “in tune with contemporary, post-Darwinian 
science in its critical interrogation of all aspects of the ‘human’” (2005: 18).  However, as 
Lawrence understood it, scientific materialism posed a significant problem for modern 
political life.  By treating the human as an endlessly tractable machine, as physiologists 
theorized, the institutions of twentieth century modernity threatened to render life 
“automatic” in the worst possible ways.  While, as we shall see, the equation between 
institutional modernity and automatism was common among his literary contemporaries, 
Lawrence associated scientific materialism with a particular kind of automatism, one that 
put him fundamentally in accord vitalist thinkers like Bergson and Sorel. 
Throughout his non-fiction of the 1920s, Lawrence links the rise of positivist 
sciences with a new historical episteme in which organic life and community were 
increasingly defined by the automatic repetitions of a codified set of culturally amenable 
ideas.  This ideology he termed “idealism.”3  In a series of non-fiction books published 
after WWI, including Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious (1921) and Fantasia of the 
                                                 
3 While Lawrence had a deep and abiding attachment to Nietzsche, a virulent critic of German idealism, his 
critique of the “ideal” is a relatively idiosyncratic formulation that closely associated with positivism.  His 
use of the term “idealism,” then, should in no way be confused with the idealism of thinkers like Fichte, 
Hegel, and Schelling.   
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Unconscious (1922), Lawrence represents scientific materialism as a total epistemic 
system in which thought in its objective character gains priority over feeling, affect and 
the vicissitudes of the body.  To live according to our ideas rather than our “passional” 
selves, Lawrence suggests, is to be forever in thrall to the ready-made habits and ideas we 
acquire through social conditioning, thereby sapping us of the spontaneity inherent in life 
itself.  As he describes in Fantasia, “The ideal mind, the brain, has become the vampire 
of modern life, sucking up the blood and the life.  There is hardly an original thought or 
original utterance possible to us.  All is sickly repetition of stale, stale ideas” (2004a: 
105-6).  Rather than see the habits of social life as the product of an unthinking mass, as 
did many of his modernist contemporaries, Lawrence understands modernity as 
characterized by an excess of thought that renders life a series of premeditated, automatic 
repetitions, bereft of organic creativity.4  Guided by the logic of materialist cause and 
effect, modernity becomes, in the words of the narrator of Kangaroo (1923), mere 
“mechanical repetition of given motions—millions of times over and over again—
according to the fixed ideal” (1994: 295).  It is, in short, a world of “pure automatism” 
(ibid.: 295). 
Such anxieties in Lawrence’s non-fiction work, particularly in his writings on 
psychoanalysis, may seem abstract when studied outside of the social context in which 
they were elaborated.5  Within his novels, however, Lawrence frequently pits the desires 
of individual characters against massifying forces of the nation-state, particularly its 
                                                 
4 Though I have given only one example here, throughout his non-fiction of the 1920s Lawrence 
consistently links idealism to notions of human automatism.  Idealism is variously called “the fall into 
automatism, mechanism, and nullity” (2004a: 152), “the little, fixed machine-principle which works the 
human psyche automatically” (2004b: 14), and “a superimposition of the abstracted, automatic, invented 
universe of man upon the spontaneous creative universe” (1988a: 69). 
5 For a biographical account of the emergence of the concept of “idealism” in Lawrence’s thinking, 
including the evolution of such ideas in Studies in Classic American Literature, see Kinkead-Weekes 
(1998). 
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institutions of subject formation, such as schools. In The Rainbow and Women in Love, 
for instance, schools serve as a primary site of the collusion between materialist science 
and the prerogatives of the state.  Ursula Brangwen’s work as a schoolmistress, which 
serves as one of the few plot continuities between these sequential novels, underscores 
the political value of materialist science in a nascent apparatus of subject-formation.6  As 
Lawrence describes in The Rainbow, the goal of schooling is “the graceless task of 
compelling many children into one disciplined, mechanical set, reducing the whole set to 
an automatic state of obedience and attention, and then of commanding their acceptance 
of various pieces of knowledge” (1989c: 355).  Here as elsewhere,7 Lawrence employs 
the language of physiological conditioning to figure education as a habituating force—
one that not only robs children of individual agency but also orients them toward ideas 
rather than the instinctive spontaneity of the body.  In both novels, schools bear the 
symbolic weight of a modern world in which a mechanistic view of the body is employed 
to minimize social affect and inhibit individual agency.  While schools figure as 
prominent impediments to individuality and agency in the work of modernists like Mann, 
Joyce and Musil, Lawrence explicitly casts these institutions as the practical application 
of a scientific materialism that reinforced the ideological pressures of mass society.  
Indeed, for Lawrence “idealism” was nothing if not the ideology of modern science—
                                                 
6 For an historical analysis of early twentieth century modes of subject formation, see Van Creveld’s The 
Rise and Decline of the State (1999). Public schooling did not become compulsory in England until 1890, 
which, as Raymond Williams points out, made Lawrence “one of the first English writers to have direct 
experience of ordinary teaching” since he taught for over three years at the Davidson Road School in 
Croydon (1973: 7). 
7 Lawrence would return to the problem of education throughout his writing career.  C.f. “Education of the 
People,” in which he suggests that the entire apparatus of education is intended to minimize individual 
agency by prioritizing the mind over the body.  That there is a specifically materialist element to such 
idealism can be seen in Ursula’s own educational experience; in The Rainbow her college professor 
proposes that life consists of nothing other than “a complexity of physical and chemical activities, of the 
same order as the activities we already know in science” (1989: 408). 
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“pure idealism” and “pure materialism” being “identical” in their orientation to human 
life (1988b: 79). 
However strongly Lawrence criticized the use of mechanistic models of 
subjectivity in modern institutions, to conclude that he exalted the ego as a transcendental 
realm of free, radical agency would be to misunderstand his critique.  Torn between the 
purely mechanistic theories of empiricist discourse and traditional notions of unbounded 
agency, Lawrence produced an alternative ontology that deeply influenced his notion of 
literary character, readerly affect, and the political stakes of art in the twentieth century. 
The most useful parallel for Lawrence’s alternative materialism is to be found not 
in the literary discourse of his contemporaries, however, but in the philosophical critique 
of scientific materialism in vitalist thinkers, such as Henri Bergson.  Though critics have 
often casually suggested that Lawrence’s work harbors a “vitalist” undercurrent, they 
have only rarely made this connection explicit.8  This can be explained in part by the 
ambiguity of the term itself, which has traditionally encompassed a variety of 
“spiritualist” theories from Antiquity to the Enlightenment.  However, in the context of 
the twentieth century, vitalism constituted a specific school of philosophical and political 
thought dedicated to combating the “radical mechanism” implicit in much of scientific 
thought.  As Sanford Schwartz explains, “Whereas the positivist applies the mechanistic 
assumptions of the physical sciences to the study of human thought, feeling, and action, 
the vitalist maintains that the organic nature of ‘life’ is irreducible to mechanistic 
explanation, and that the methods appropriate to the investigation of the physical world 
lead only to a distorted understanding of human nature” (1992: 278).  Vitalists like 
                                                 
8 Though Wallace stops short of calling Lawrence a “vitalist,” he notes that Lawrence had encountered 
Bergson’s ideas as early as 1911, in article by A. J. Balfour, entitled “Creative Evolution and Philosophic 
Doubt.”  For other considerations of Lawrence as a vitalist, see Lehan (1992) and Watson (2003). 
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Bergson and Driesh rejected the radical mechanism of physiology as both a philosophical 
and practical matter.  For them, matter itself exhibited a deep intransigence to the total 
domination of conditioned reflex.  Jane Bennett has called this aspect of vitalism “a 
commitment to the indeterminacies of material causality—a philosophical faith in 
indetermination” (2010: 53). 
 By investing organic matter with creative potentiality, twentieth century vitalists 
attempted to excavate conceptual space for individual agency without recourse to 
outmoded notions of a transcendental ego or the determinisms of positivist thought.  For 
the philosophically inclined Lawrence, this inversion of empiricist ontology offered a 
way of imagining new kinds of aesthetic experience and social relationships beyond the 
disciplinary mechanisms of industrial modernity.  Just as thinkers like Bergson stressed 
the inadequacy of positivist accounts of subjectivity, Lawrence looked to the material 
body in forging an alternative account of human agency.  In Psychoanalysis and the 
Unconscious and Fantasia of the Unconscious, Lawrence argues that bodily being is the 
source of all “real” agency and creativity in human behavior.  Employing an esoteric 
anatomy of “plexuses” and “ganglia” to challenge Freudian ideas about the unconscious, 
Lawrence argues that the “unconscious” is a physical, embodied fact and the source of all 
human potentiality.9  Lawrence tasked himself in these books with countering what he 
understood as a strictly determinist account of human action by defining “the nature of 
the true, pristine unconscious, in which all our genuine impulse arises” (2004b: 12).  
These books collectively elaborate a model of the human subject in which the body, 
rather than the ideal mind, functions as “the fountain of real motivity” and the source of 
                                                 
9 By insisting on the “unconscious” rather than the body itself in these books, Lawrence in some sense 
returned to a pre-Freudian model of a material unconscious.  See Lancelot Law Whyte’s important 1960 
work, The Unconscious Before Freud for background on Enlightenment ideas of an embodied unconscious. 
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human agency (ibid.: 12).  This account places priority on the body as a reservoir of 
impulses that may allow subjects to transcend the idealist habits of modern political 
belonging.  As Lawrence writes in “Education of the People,” the body “contains all our 
radical knowledge, knowledge-non-ideal, non-mental, yet still knowledge, primary 
cognition, individual and potent” (1988b: 129).  As the source of our “primary 
cognition,” the material body functions as the baseline of all human consciousness and 
the source of action.  Equipped with this embodied, non-mental awareness, individuals 
are capable of exceeding the narrow boundaries imposed on them through the institutions 
of modern life, Lawrence suggests.  Embodied cognition thus entails a radical awareness 
of the necessarily creative nature of life, in which emotion figures as a form of knowing 
at odds with the disciplinary mandates of modernity.  
Lawrence’s emphasis on the instinctual body is perhaps his most characteristic 
gesture, one enabling a distinctly modernist mode of literary characterization— an ego 
that is no longer solitary, whole or durable, in which fluidity, multiplicity and instability 
reign.10  But while he strives to avoid the pitfalls of positivism on the one hand and a 
faith in the transcendent ego on the other, Lawrence’s theory of character, like Bergson’s, 
creates a problem when it comes to volition.  As Judith Shklar argues, if human volition 
depends on actions that are “indeterminate [and] unforethought,” they are by their very 
nature “unpredictable” (1958: 644).  Free actions thus “occur on those rare occasions 
when we act in defiance of reason and calculation to follow some inner urge of our 
hidden self” (ibid.).  Such an understanding of vitalism would certainly square with the 
traditional reading of Lawrence as a radical individualist, whose work forecloses the 
                                                 
10 For Lawrence’s thinking about physiology and literary character, see his 5 June 1914 letter to Edward 
Garnett, which calls for moving beyond “the old stable ego of the character” in favor of a “physiology of 
matter” (1981: 90-1). 
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possibility of political action at a systemic level.  For if we are freest when least 
captivated by our ideas, when the primary cognition of the body overtakes the conscious 
mind, what room is left for collective action of agents?  Lawrence’s vitalism would thus 
seem incompatible with a political solution to the idealism of modernity.  But, as we shall 
see, by transforming the notion of agency along these vitalist lines, Lawrence worked to 
rethink the tension between collective and individual life.  His critique of human 
automatism took the form of a social vision in which the body could liberate subjects 
from the disciplinary apparatuses and cognitive habits of twentieth century life.  
 
The Plumed Serpent and the Political Body 
For Lawrence, vitalism offered a way of solving the intractable problem of 
collectivism in the era of mass habituation.  This political project can be seen most 
clearly in The Plumed Serpent, a novel that extends the problem of modern automatism to 
the political body as a whole.  While Lawrence’s novels regularly invoke the language of 
automatism, the novels he wrote immediately following WWI, including Aaron’s Rod 
and Kangaroo, explore the possibility of non-habituating social arrangements.  In The 
Plumed Serpent this matter is given its most explicit treatment as structural problem of 
modern life.  As Jeff Wallace has noted, “With more conviction than either of its 
predecessors, The Plumed Serpent adheres to the notion of a religious-political 
programme and all its attendant paraphernalia—hymns, rituals, the appropriation of 
churches, the letters to clergy and politicians—in order to bring about a ‘new conception 
of human life’” (2005: 226).  Although it represents Lawrence’s most fully realized effort 
to imagine a non-habituating social order, The Plumed Serpent has long been the object 
of criticism among even Lawrence’s most dedicated champions. 
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In his otherwise laudatory book D. H. Lawrence, Novelist (1956), F. R. Leavis set 
the stage for much modern criticism of the novel when he argued that Lawrence was 
simply out of his depth in dealing with political themes.  So unlike the novels of 
“personal engagement” (1956: 71) like Sons and Lovers and Women in Love, The Plumed 
Serpent, Leavis argued, “cherishes the illusion that it grasps and presents more in the way 
of positive ‘answer’ to the large issues raised than it actually does” (1956: 73).  The result 
is “a bad book” (1956: 21) that appears “willed and mechanical” and “produces 
boredom” (1956: 71).11  Subsequent critics have followed Leavis’ lead in seeing The 
Plumed Serpent as a relatively minor work, with most recent engagements centering on 
Lawrence’s problematic imagination of “the primitive.”12  By consigning The Plumed 
Serpent to the margins of Lawrence’s canon, critics have refused to entertain the 
possibility that it might be the fullest achievement of Lawrence’s political vision.  This, 
despite the fact that Lawrence himself considered it his most fully realized a novel, an 
opinion he repeatedly stated in his correspondence throughout the two years of the 
novel’s composition.13  His preference for The Plumed Serpent may very well reside in 
the novel’s attempt to offer a positive vision of political life outside the bounds of an 
automatizing modernity.  
                                                 
11 Leavis would return to The Plumed Serpent in his 1976 appraisal of Lawrence’s work, Thought, Words 
and Creativity: Art and Thought in Lawrence.  Seeking to understand how Lawrence could regard the novel 
as his “most important” work, Leavis reiterates his earlier criticisms and judges Lawrence’s view of the 
novel “a disconcerting aberration” (1976: 60). 
12 See Brett Neilson’s essay on “narrative primitivism” (1997), as well as chapters in Terry Eagleton’s The 
English Novel (2005) and Marianna Torgovnick’s Gone Primitive (1990).  
13 Two months after having begun the novel’s first draft in Mexico in 1923, Lawrence reported to Adele 
Seltzer, “I like my new novel best of all—much” (1987a: 455).  A full two years later, as he was 
completing an entirely new iteration of the novel, Lawrence wrote to Curtis Brown, “It is different from my 
other books: and to me, the one that means most” (1989: 260), a sentiment he was to repeat again and again 
before the novel’s publication 1926.  As he told Brown in a different letter, “I consider this my most 
important novel, so far” (1989: 271). 
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The story of Kate Leslie, the widow of an Irish revolutionary, whose travels in 
Mexico bring her into contact with an Aztec religious and political renaissance, the novel 
traces the protagonist’s transition from a Western tourist to an active participant in the 
movement, and ultimately her beatification as a goddess in the Aztec pantheon.  The 
automatisms of thought elsewhere common in Lawrence’s work are here figured as a 
problem of global proportions, as economic modernization threatens to disseminate 
Western mores, including the ideology Lawrence had earlier termed “idealism.”  In part 
this ideology manifests itself in the habits of thought typical of the American tourists that 
populate the early portions of the narrative.  Guided by what the novel calls an 
“American automatism,” these tourists exhibit the ready-made political ideas of global 
capitalism in their dealings with Mexico (1987b: 93).  Their wanderings, however, take 
place against the backdrop of a general economic process in which the modernization of 
Mexico threatens to transform the indigenous population by prioritizing idealist forms of 
knowledge.  Late in the novel, as Kate experiences a reluctance to accept the native 
religious renaissance, Cipriano accuses her of being stuck in American habits of thought:  
You can only think with American thoughts … Nearly all women are like that: 
even Mexican women of the Spanish-Mexican class.  They are all thinking 
nothing but U.S.A. thoughts, because those are the ones that go with the way they 
dress their hair. … But you only think like this because you have had these 
thoughts put in your head, just as in Mexico you spend centavos and pesos, 
because that is the Mexican money you have put in your pocket.  It’s what they 
give you at the bank.  So when you say you are free, you are not free.  You are 
compelled all the time to be thinking U.S.A. thoughts—compelled, I must say.  
You have not as much choice as a slave.  As the peons must eat tortillas, tortillas, 
tortillas, because there is nothing else, you must think these U.S.A. thoughts ….  
Every day you must eat those tortillas, tortillas.—Till you don’t know how you 
would like something else. (ibid.: 204-5) 
 
Here Lawrence suggests that thoughts are conditioned not simply by one’s education but 
also by the seemingly innocuous details of everyday life, including cultural practices and 
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modes of production.  The reference to Mexican pesos conjures the broader context of 
economic modernization, one in which foreign values supplant native social practices 
even as the form of currency remains the same.  Fashion is here coded as a kind of 
stimulus that works to condition behavior in new and determinate ways—a process of 
“Americanization” through collective habits.14  “U.S.A. thoughts” are, in other words, not 
just “foreign” to the indigenous population of Mexico; the influx of American styles and 
American goods produces a fundamentally new form of social life defined by material 
wealth and its particular mode of cognition, the intellect.  As Lawrence’s narrator 
comments, the rising importance of American automobiles in Mexico threatens to 
fundamentally change the very essence of the country’s inhabitants: “the automobile will 
make roads even through the inaccessible soul of the Indian” (ibid.: 116).  The question 
that Lawrence poses in The Plumed Serpent is how to constitute a political body capable 
of countering idealism and the automatisms of thought it promotes.   
As Kate grows to recognize the habits of her traveling companions, she recoils, 
“Give me the mystery and let the world live again for me! … And deliver me from man’s 
automatism” (1987b: 105).  This deliverance she will find in Don Ramón’s native 
religious renaissance, a political movement that provides the very thing Lawrence’s 
project might have seemed to call into question, namely a non-habituating form of 
political life.  To imagine a resolution to these problems, Lawrence turned toward a 
                                                 
14 Fashion is a recurrent site of modernist anxiety about automatic behavior. In his 1928 book, Propaganda, 
Freud’s American nephew Edward Bernays suggested that fashion is paradigmatic of the use of 
conditioned reflex in modern politics.  He explains, “A man buying a suit of clothes imagines that he is 
choosing, according to his taste and his personality” when in reality he is “obeying the orders of an 
anonymous gentleman tailor in London” (2005: 61).  What appears at first sight as an index of individual 
volition—the choice of clothes—discloses an essentially avolitional process of manipulation and 
conditioned reflex.  For Wyndham Lewis, fashion becomes a functional metaphor for describing modern 
politics themselves.  As he puts the matter in The Art of Being Ruled (1927), “The ideas of a time are like 
the clothes of a season: they are as arbitrary, as much imposed by some superior will which is seldom 
explicit” (1989a: 363). 
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model of political organization very closely mirrored in the thinking of vitalist 
philosopher Georges Sorel.  Deeply drawn to Bergson’s critique of scientific materialism, 
Sorel worked to extend Bergson’s understanding of intuition into the political realm by 
theorizing its role in modern mass movements.15  Central to his project was the same 
problem that dogged Lawrence—how to forge a structure of political action that does not 
foreclose the embodied agency of individuals.  
In The Plumed Serpent, Lawrence confronts the same problem.  Here the bargain 
affected between collective and individual life is dramatized through the figure of Kate, 
who struggles to accept a new sense of self promised by Ramón’s religious renaissance.  
We might even understand the plot of the novel as structured according to Kate’s ability 
to realize a dynamic sense of self through participation with the collective, a drama that 
reaches its highest pitch and final synthesis in the closing chapter.  Even after she has 
married Cipriano and joined the Aztec pantheon in the guise of the goddess Malintzi, she 
still desires a purely individualized existence, which produces a conflict between her 
“two selves: one, a new one … which was her sensitive, desirous self: the other hard and 
finished, accomplished … (1987b: 429).  In the contest between these two selves, Kate 
comes to realize that she is most fully herself when she is “limited” by her connection 
with the collective (ibid.: 439).  Contact with this new social body enables her to sustain a 
dynamic—we might say vitalist—sense of self and to fully commit to the revolutionary 
project.  Kate’s story is one of overcoming a purely “European” adherence to unbounded 
individualism, which finds its fullest expression not in an outright collectivist bargain like 
                                                 
15 For more on Sorel’s relationship to Bergson’s philosophy, see Shklar (1958), Lovejoy (1913), and 
Jennings (1999). 
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socialism but in a new social order that maintains individuality by transforming it into the 
very substance of collective life. 
But in order for collectivity to be an enabling force within the world of the novel, 
it has to abstain from the disciplinary formations so frequently discussed by Lawrence as 
the bane of modern life.  Lawrence consequently invokes a Sorelian notion of myth, 
which acts as a prophylactic against the automatic and the ready-made in collective 
structures.  By placing myth at the center of a political revolution in The Plumed Serpent, 
Lawrence envisions a vitalist social structure capable of providing the impetus to 
individualized agency.  If for modernists myth often acts as a conservative effort to 
consolidate national belonging under the sign of faith, humanism or some other waning 
ideology, Lawrence’s notion of myth works in opposition to rather than in concert with 
ideology.  
This sense of myth formed a central component of Sorel’s vitalist philosophy.  In 
his “Letter to Daniel Halévy” (1907), Sorel defined myth as a body of images capable of 
evoking all those instinctive sentiments of a group that reside at the level of unconscious 
desires.  He explains, “men who are participating in great social movements always 
picture their coming action in the form of images of battle in which their cause is certain 
to triumph” (2002: 20).  As a force for political action myth thus functions an actuating 
power beyond the simple forms of conditioned behavior and indoctrination typical of 
modern political life.  Such an idea of myth coheres around the very ontology of 
embodiment shared by Bergson and Lawrence.  Because myth transcends the doctrinal 
character of political ideology, it understands political actors as driven by the same forms 
of agency that cannot easily be called “willed.”  As Judith Shklar has pointed out, for 
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Sorel political freedom is a kind of creativity, “characterized by the absence of 
premeditation,” and action “must emerge from some blind, nonrational inner impulse” 
(1958: 647).  Myth thus serves as the key term in a properly vitalist political framework, 
a force capable of both triggering revolutionary action and negotiating the balance 
between collectivity and individuality in a post-revolutionary society.  Lawrence came to 
very similar conclusions in his own thinking about alternative forms of political life. 
In The Plumed Serpent he dramatizes the power of a myth as the foundation of a 
non-habituating social order.  Here, it is not Sorel’s myth of the general strike that 
actuates behavior, but the myth of an exit from the broad consequences of economic 
modernization.  Lead by Don Ramón, who claims to be the living incarnation of the 
Aztec god Quetzalcoatl, this revolutionary movement promises its adherents relief from 
the automatisms of thought promoted by capitalist modernity.  Unlike the “ready-made” 
world of the United States and the industrial West, Ramón’s political and religious 
renaissance seeks to restore spontaneity to both individual and collective life by 
reanimating embodied life as a social good.  This in turn creates a “new body” (ibid.: 
200) that then serves as a mode individuation in which one’s particularity—what the 
novel characterizes as the “god” in one’s “manhood” or “womanhood” (ibid.: 199)—is 
both expressed through intuitive forms of action and enabled by a dynamic social 
structure.   
Lawrence insisted in his late non-fiction that what the twentieth century lacked 
was precisely what myth enabled.  As he explained in Apocalypse (1931), “We have lost 
almost entirely the great and intricately developed sensual awareness, or sense-
awareness, and sense-knowledge, of the ancients.  It was a great depth of knowledge 
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arrived at direct, by instinct and intuition, as we say, not by reason.  It was a knowledge 
based not on words but on images” (1980: 91).  In The Plumed Serpent, Lawrence found 
his most perfect articulation of what such images might be in the figure of indigenous 
gods. These gods operate as the “images” or myths that catalyze the revolutionary 
movement and preempt the collapse of individual agency into the “idealism” of a modern 
political order. 
In The Plumed Serpent, the anti-dogmatic potential of revolutionary myth enables 
a social system in which the primary cognition of embodied life serves as the core of a 
new collectivity.  Contrary, then, to critics like Anne Fernihough, who concludes that 
“Lawrence’s stance is, in the final analysis, apolitical, if by politics we implicate large, 
controlling organizations” (1993: 187), a consideration of Lawrence’s vitalism shows 
him imagining structural catalysts to new modes of political affiliation.  Lawrence’s 
novel emphasizes embodiment and spontaneity over the idealisms of both capitalism and 
communism.  During a century in which social, cultural and political experience was 
increasingly viewed as a means of habituating human behavior, vitalist embodiment 
offered Lawrence a genuine way of escaping the categories of left and right with their 
ready-made models of collectivity.  But, as we shall see, Lawrence’s vitalism runs deeper 
than mere plot, raising questions about aesthetic form itself.   
 
A Vitalist Aesthetic 
Vitalist thought suffers from a constraint unique to modern philosophical schools.  
Bergson, Sorel and Lawrence recognized that the central tenets of vitalism could easily 
devolve into the dogma of idealism.  Bergson explained this problem in Creative 
Evolution: “Our freedom, in the very movements by which it is affirmed, creates the 
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growing habits that will stifle it if it fails to renew itself by a constant effort.  It is dogged 
by automatism.  The most living thought becomes frigid in the formula that expresses it.  
The word turns against the idea” (127).  In order to counter the “automatic” as a social 
and scientific category, vitalist philosophy re-imagined not just the content of 
philosophical discourse, but its form as well by placing new emphasis on the affective 
plane of readerly experience.  By this I mean to suggest that the work Bergson and Sorel 
self-consciously refuses ideational closure in order to prompt what Bergson called 
“integral knowledge,” knowledge grounded in embodied intuition rather than intellect 
alone.  As Judith Shklar has explained, Bergson’s thought is essentially “aesthetic” in 
nature (1958: 656); this element of his work is “not an accidental feature, a matter of 
careless expression. His method was an integral part of his thought” (1958: 635).  In 
attempting to elicit an intuitive response to his philosophy, Bergson rejected the idealisms 
of traditional philosophical discourse. 
Sorel’s work poses the question of form even more directly.  As he explains in 
Reflections on Violence, “Ordinary language could not produce these results [revolution] 
in any very certain manner; appeal must be made to collections of images,” which must 
be “taken together and through intuition alone, before any considered analyses are made” 
(2002: 113).  Sorel called this discursive method “diremption.”  Literally meaning “a 
tearing asunder,” diremption effects a formal preemption of the reader’s “idealist” 
inclinations through a commitment to what might be termed an aesthetic of abstraction, 
incompletion, or obscurity.16  In “every complex body of knowledge,” he explained, there 
                                                 
16 As J. Cerrulo explains, “The diremptive investigator proceeds indirectly: circling around the subject and 
viewing it from various vantage points rather than seeking the single one from which its totality can be 
taken in; pursuing tangents; considering various aspects of it without concern for their inter-connectedness; 
and, in fact, deliberately foregoing all attempts to grasp the thing in toto” (2003: 136). 
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resides “a clear and an obscure region,” the latter of which is always “the most 
important” (2002: 136). The power of vitalist discourse consequently resides in its ability 
to frustrate ideation and vest readers with interpretive agency.  Inhibited from merely 
reproducing vitalism as an intellectual doctrine, Sorel reasoned, readers would be forced 
to embody vitalism’s refusal of all things automatic. 
Lawrence saw the same problems at work within literary discourse.  The Plumed 
Serpent thematizes a vitalist mode of political organization where embodied knowledge 
overrides the idealisms and automatisms of modern society.  But it is one thing to depict 
a utopian world and quite another to make it, for modeling a vitalist society could easily 
produce the idealist habits Lawrence wants to discredit.  The question of vitalist form 
thus figures prominently in his thinking as a way of inciting in readers those forms of 
knowledge that he had identified with the primary cognition of the body.  As he 
explained in “Morality and the Novel” (1925), an essay written just after completing The 
Plumed Serpent, the job of the novel is not that of philosophy, religion and science, 
which are “busy nailing things down, to get a stable equilibrium” (1985b: 172).  To the 
contrary, he argues, “The novel is the highest complex of subtle inter-relatedness that 
man has discovered. … If you try to nail anything down, in the novel, either it kills the 
novel, or the novel gets up and walks away with the nail” (ibid.: 172).17  The power of the 
novel resides in its unique ability to transcend the cognitive habits essential to scientific 
materialism and modern political structures.  As he explained in “The Future of the 
Novel” (1923), the job of the novel is “to present us with new, really new feelings” 
                                                 
17 Lawrence’s letters echo this vision of literary form.  As he wrote to Carlo Linati while he was writing 
The Plumed Serpent, “But really, Signor Linati, do you think that books should be sort of toys, nicely built 
up of observations and sensations, all finished and complete?—I don’t. … whoever reads me will be in the 
thick of the scrimmage, and if he doesn’t like it – if he wants a safe seat in the audience—let him read 
somebody else” (1989: 200-201). 
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(1985a: 155) by means of formal devices that resist the purely intellectualized knowledge 
endemic to modern life. 
Such an aesthetic was already at work in Lawrence’s novels, wherever style 
attempts to confound the idealizing impulse of readers.  For example, The Rainbow 
attempts to elicit a response from readers that differs sharply from the automatisms of 
thought so regularly confronted by his characters.18  In the “Cathedral” chapter, to take 
but one well-known example, Lawrence describes Will and Anna Brangwen’s experience 
of a church.  As they enter the building, the narration departs from a realist description in 
order to indulge in what soon became signature Lawrentian prose:  
Containing birth and death, potential with all the noise and transitation of life, the 
cathedral remained hushed, a great, involved seed, whereof the flower would be 
radiant life inconceivable, but whose beginning and whose end were the circle of 
silence.  Spanned round with the rainbow, the jeweled gloom folded music upon 
silence, light upon darkness, fecundity upon death, as a seed folds leaf and silence 
upon the root and the flower, hushing up the secrete of all between its parts, the 
death out of which it fell, the life into which it has dropped, the immortality it 
involves, and the death it will embrace again. (1989c: 187) 
 
This passage does not offer readers a logical translation of Will and Anna’s experience 
into realist description.  Instead, Lawrence produces a hypersensual prose that becomes 
virtually unmoored from any reference outside itself.  The organic figure of a seed 
suggests an unfolding or blooming—but of what?  Through his juxtaposition of 
contraries—music and silence, light and dark, birth and death—and the use of the 
obsolete word “transitation,” Lawrence pushes the image of the seed beyond the ordinary 
language of literary description, as if the passage were itself caught in the process of life.  
We might say that the passage performs what Sorel calls “diremption,” in that it is 
                                                 
18 In The Rainbow, the importance of readerly affect is self-consciously mirrored in the plot, as Lawrence 
works to overcome what one character calls the “dead language” modern social life (1989c: 423). 
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capable of being known only in the sense that it is felt.19  Form is here deployed to 
disrupt the reader’s reliance on the habits of mind over than the primary cognition of 
feeling.  Anne Fernihough has indeed noted that “Lawrence’s own prose-style represents 
an attempt to render palpable the energies of the unconscious” such that “we are never 
allowed to feel that a final ‘signified’ has been reached” (1993: 73).20   
Such moments, in which pure being eclipses the ready protocols of realist 
narrative, are common throughout Lawrence’s fiction.  In The Plumed Serpent, however, 
Lawrence gives the stakes of affect an explicitly political dimension by insisting that a 
solution to modern automatism depends on embodied knowledge.  At the most immediate 
level, the novel’s use of religious experience mirrors the modes of affect seen in works 
like The Rainbow, with ritualized dance, drumming, and the incantations of religious 
hymns forming central aspects of The Plumed Serpent.21  Even the gods themselves are 
figured as little more than a “fertility of sound,” a sensual appeal to new ways of knowing 
(1987b: 62).  Unlike Aaron’s Rod and Kangaroo, novels that likewise take up questions 
of political organization, here Lawrence employs the unspeakable poetry of religious 
experience to engender something approaching the primary cognition of embodiment—a 
readerly experience that is not strictly reducible to the idealism of standard linguistic 
                                                 
19 The relationship between sensation in The Rainbow and vitalism has not been lost on critics. Sean 
Watson has suggested that The Rainbow is a novel that “does not trace life in the domain of language, but 
in the domain of pure sensation” (2003: 27) in a manner that mirrors Bergson’s work. 
20 For more on modernism and an aesthetic of vagueness, c.f. Megan Quigley’s article, which argues that 
modernism mirrored “the revolt against positivism in the philosophy of language” (2008: 103). 
21 As Louis L. Martz has pointed out, one of the primary differences between the first draft of the novel, 
published as Quetzalcoatl (1995), and the final version is that the latter is marked by an increased emphasis 
on such forms of religious experience: “In Quetzalcoatl the local and the mythological are closely wrought 
together, evenly balanced in emphasis.  But in the Plumed Serpent the additional mythic and transcendent 
elements—sermons, ruminations, expanded hymns, expanded ritual—tend to dominate the landscape and 
local detail preserved from the early vision …” (1995: xxix).  This endows the final version of the novel 
with a kind of political cosmopolitanism that the first draft lacks.  For more on Lawrence’s relationship to 
native dancing, see L. D. Clark’s introduction to The Plumed Serpent as well as Lawrence’s essays on the 
topic in Mornings in Mexico (1927). 
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formulae.  Myth likewise plays an important part in this effort.  Because it does not 
depend on the resources of ordinary language, myth promises to speak in the language of 
sensation, of vital knowledge.  As Lawrence wrote in Apocalypse, myth enables people 
“to achieve a consummation of a certain state of consciousness, to fulfill a certain state of 
feeling-awareness” (1980: 91).  The sense awareness central to vitalist ontology is the 
very thing disabled by modern social structures.  Within the novel, myth works as a non-
ideological form of politics, one that speaks as much to the characters engaged in 
revolution as it does to readers caught in the automatisms of modern social life.  
“Dogma,” he writes in “Education of the People,” “is the translation of the religious 
impulse into an intellectual term … a finite, fixed, mechanical thing” (1988b: 108).  Form 
becomes in his analysis the motive power of individual agency—an affective experience 
that inhibits the reification of desires into the ready-mades of political action.   
 
Automatic Modernism 
 
For many writers, twentieth century life could be defined above all by the welter 
of cultural forces that daily conditioned thought and action, producing habitual, docile 
subjects.  Rather than equip subjects with the ability to act as agents in an increasingly 
complex world, mass society appeared to compromise the autonomy of individuals by 
outfitting them with habits and stereotypes of thought that, by definition, fall below the 
level of conscious apprehension.  Lawrence’s critique of modern “idealism” finds its 
counterpart in the work of writers like Wyndham Lewis, who argued that “the machinery 
of education, of the press, cinema, wireless, and social environment” diminishes people’s 
genuine individuality, providing them “with a system of habits which agree with their 
neighbor's habits, and from this coma they seldom wake” (1989: 44-5).  Like Lawrence, 
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Lewis understood the findings of physiologists like Pavlov as auguring a new form of 
political life that denied the agency of individuals.  Science, Lewis argued, had not only 
demonstrated that our most individual beliefs and practices are the product of an 
impersonal force of conditioning—it had provided government and industry with a 
blueprint of the human machine.22  
Once a dominant concern of modernist writers and their critical contemporaries, 
the political stakes of embodiment are now finding renewed interest among critics.  The 
return to such materialist concerns, now underway widely underway in the humanities,23 
resides in its capacity to help us understand the political, cultural and philosophical stakes 
of physical embodiment in productive ways.  In the context of literary modernism, these 
discourses augur a return to some fundamental literary and political problems,24 as well 
as a more rigorous understanding of the relationship between modernism and early 
twentieth century discourses of embodiment.   
 For several recent scholars of modernism, embodiment has emerged as a crucial 
site of modernist literary practice.  In the last several years critics like Lisi Schoenbach 
and Liesl Olson have attempted to uncover the utility of pragmatism’s understanding of 
habit within literary modernism, just as Douglas Mao has called attention to the 
intercourse between physiology and modernist aesthetics.  If “[h]abit is the ballast that 
                                                 
22 For Lewis, this fact was complicated by philosophies like vitalism, which in his view tended to reinforce 
the appeal of fatalist doctrines like scientific materialism.  Cf. Time and Western Man (1927). 
23 While the range of critical investments in materiality is probably too long to list, the so-called “affective 
turn,” engagement with cognitive science, and a new investment in vitalism across the humanities all point 
to a renewed interest in matter.  For an overview, see the introduction to Coole and Frost’s New 
Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics (2010). 
24 In addition to the matters of collectivity and individualism that I have outlined in this article, the 
preoccupation of modernist-era critical schools with embodiment is surely one avenue of promising 
research.  The Russian Formalist aversion to the “automatism of perception” (1998: 21) and the New 
Critical critique of the “superficial, automatic and cheap mental and emotional responses” (1959: 102) of 
mass society underscores the problems of habit and embodiment for any account of modernist literary 
form. 
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chains the dog to his vomit,” (1957: 8) as Beckett wrote in 1930, these scholars suggest it 
is simultaneously a lot more than merely a dead-end of experience in industrial 
modernity; it is the very condition of possibility for literary innovation.  However 
promising these models of habit are for discerning modernism’s relationship to everyday 
life (Olson) and the avant-garde (Schoenbach), scholarship that does not engage with the 
broader scientific and political context of habit is likely to mischaracterize the 
countervailing way in which automatism and embodiment figure within modernist 
literary experiment.  Modernist preoccupation with collective and individual habit took 
shape within a specific historical conjuncture defined by positivism, the nation-state, and 
economic modernization.  These forces promoted a new epistemic orientation toward the 
body as a machine; this turn defined a field of knowledge in which individual volition 
and collective will were redefined in material terms.  In this environment, embodiment 
became a primary aspect of literary experimentation.   
While Lawrence’s interest in the “vitality” of the human body could be read as an 
idiosyncratic response to the political problems of the era, his enduring attention to the 
mechanizing forces of industrial society is in fact typical of modernist literary practice.  
For Lawrence and his contemporaries, the relationship between embodiment and mass 
politics was crucially important to literary practice. In the work of Wyndham Lewis, for 
instance, the concurrence of mass society and new scientific paradigms like behaviorism 
diminished powers of individual cognition, even as the body appeared as a possible 
solution to the automatisms of modern life.  For Rebecca West, scientific materialism 
provided a model for understanding cultural endurance and collectivity amid the 
transformations wrought by economic modernization.  Indeed, drawing on her readings 
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of Ivan Pavlov’s Conditioned Reflexes (1924), West forged an entire literary aesthetic 
geared toward the value and dangers of embodied automatism.  In A Strange Necessity 
(1928), West argued for a vision of literary form grounded in the politics of what she 
called “body-consciousness” (1987b: 99), a term that both closely mirrors Lawrence’s 
insistence on the “primary cognition” of the body and underscores the intimate link 
between physiological automatism and the politics of literary form.   
For these writers, embodiment stands as both a problem of modern political life as 
well as a potential solution—one to be affected through the stimuli of literary experience.  
With the emergence of nationalist institutions of subject formation and a modern mass 
media, automatic behaviors appeared as evidence of the radical circumscription of 
individual agency.  Yet, as Lawrence’s emphasis on the agency of the body shows, habit 
was not a monolithic category to which all modernists objected.  His vitalist political 
vision depends on a body for which agency and automatism are virtually 
indistinguishable—a body for which volition means foregoing ideational willing.  If 
scientific materialism deflated Enlightenment notions of individual autonomy and 
judgment, modernism takes this fact as an incitement to re-conceive the modern political 
subject in terms that incorporate the body—as both passive register of stimuli and active 
agent in the world.  The body becomes not the enemy of agency, autonomy and the 
utopian promise of modernity, but its very essence.   
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